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{L A. No. 19775. In Bank. Aug. 26, 194fI.J 
F. WALTER FRENCH, Petitioner, v. FRANK M. JOR-
DAN, as Secretary of State, etc., et aI., Respondents. 
[1] Elections - .Mandamus - Duties Enforceable-Preparation of 
Ballot.-Mandamus is the proper remedy to eompel the Secre-
tary of State and a eounty registrar of voters to omit from 
a general A1ection ballot any reference to the office of a su-
perior court judge, the incumbent of which had died after 
April lst in an election year and after his reelection at the 
primary. (Codl' Civ. Proc., § 1085.) 
[2] Judges-Vacancies.-Where a superior eourt judge dies after 
April 1st in an election vear and after he baa been reelect.ed 
[1] See 10 Oal.Jur. 158; 18 Am.Jur. 888. 
[2] See 14 Oal.Jm. 787. 
14cX.. Dig. References: [1] Elections, 1146(3); [2] Judges, 15. 
.f 
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at the primarY, the vacancy ereated in the oftlce by bis death 
may only be fllled by the governor under Const., art. VI, § 8, 
and the person so appointed docs not hold office merely until 
the following January, but continues to bold until commence-
ment of the new term two years thereafter. (Overruling in part 
lJe/JrtlefJ v. OollifJs.220 Cal. 759. 32 P.2d 604.) 
PROCEEDING in mandamus to compel omission from 
ballot any reference· to oftice of a superior court judge. 
Writ granted. 
F. Walter French, in pro. per., Frank J. Indovina and 
J. Leroy Irwin for Petitioner. 
Joeeph W. Aidlin, in pro. per., and Robert W. Harrison 
for Real Party in Interest. 
Robert W. Kenny, Attorney General, Robert O. Cur-
ran, Deputy Attorney General, Harold W. Kennedy, County 
counsel (Los Angeles), and Charles C. Stanley, Jr., Deputy 
County Counsel, for R~ondents. 
SHENK, J.-This is an application for the writ of man-
date to compel the secretary of state and the Registrar of 
Voters of Los Angeles County, respondents herein, to omit 
from the ballot to be used at the general election to be held 
on Tuesday, November 6, 1946, any reference to the office 
of Judge of the Superior Court, County of Los Angeles, 
Oftice No. 10. An alternative writ was issued. The mat-
ter is submitted on the petition and general demurrers 
thereto showing the following facts: 
On November 6, 1940, the Honorable Judge Beardsley was 
elected to succeed himself as Judge of the Superior Court 
in and for the County of Los Angeles. The term for which 
he was then elected was six years, expiring in January, 
1947. He was a candidate for reelection at the primary 
election held on June 4, 1946, the office being designated 
on the ballot as Office No. 10. He was opposed at that elec-
tion but J:eCeived a majority of all the votes east for that 
office and was therefore elected for a full term commencing 
in January, 1947. He passed away on June 10, 1946. 
It is alleged in the petition that the respondents intend to, 
and unless otherwise ordered by the court will, include in the 
oftices to be filled at the ensuing general election in November. . 
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the office of Judge of the Superior Court, Los Angeles County, 
Office No. 10, and will place upon that ballot 88 a candidate 
the name of any qualified person who is nominated for that 
office pursuant to division 5, chapter 3 (§ 3000 et seq.) of the 
Elections Code, toget.her with a space provided for a so-called 
"write-in" candidate. 
[1] The present proceeding is appropriate to the end 
sought. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1085; Gage v. Jordan, 23 Cal.2d 
794, 800 [147 P.2d 3871 : Donham v. Gross. 210 Ca1. 190. 193 
[290 P. 884].) 
It is the position of the petitioner that by reason of Judge 
Beardsley's death a vacancy occurred in the office theretofore 
occupied by him, which vacancy may only be filled by the 
governor under section 8 of article VI of the state Constitu-
tion as adopted on November 2, 1926, and that the person 80 
appointed will hold office until January 3, 1949. 
The respondents contend that the current vacancy occurred 
at a time which will permit the nomination by petition pur-
suant to sections 3000 et seq. of the Elections Code, or that 
some person may be elected to that office by the "write-in" 
method. 
[a] Section 8 of article VI of the Constitution provides as 
follows: "The term of office of judges of the superior courts 
shall be six years from and after the first Monday of January 
after the first day of January next succeeding their election. 
A vacancy in such office shall be filled at the next succeeding 
general State election after the first day of April next suc-
ceeding the accrual of such vacancy by the election of a judge 
for a full term to commence on the first Monday of January 
after the first day of January next succeeding his election. 
The Governor shall appoint a person to hold such vacant office 
until the commencement of such term." 
The language just quoted is plain, explicit and free from 
ambiguity. There is no necessity or opportunity to resort to 
judicial construction to ascertain its meaning. When the faets 
in any particular case come within its provisions it is the duty 
of the court to apply and enforce it. The respondents contend 
that circumstances were shown to justify a refusal to apply 
it in Bearden v. Collins, 220 Cal. 759 [32 P.2d 604], and that 
they likewise appear in the present ease. It will appear from 
the following discussion that the facts here presented call for 
its application. 
The Constitution, section 2% of article n, by amendment 
. ; 
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adopted November 3, 1908, gave the Legislature plenary power 
to enact laws relative to nominations of delegates to conven-
tions of political parties and for the direct nomination of can-
didates for public office at elections to be known and desig-
nated as primary elections. Section 23 of the Direct Primary 
Law (Stats. 1913, p. 1404) provided that in the ease of but 
one person to be elected to a judicial office at the November 
election, the name of the candidate who at the primary election 
received a majority of the total number of votes east for all 
the candidates for such office, should be the only one for such 
office placed on the official ballot at the ensuing November 
election Prior to 1926 the nonpartisan offices for which can-
didates might be elected at the primaries did not include 
judicial offices. Consequently situations similar to that pre-
sented in Miller v. Childs, 28 Cal.App. 478 [152 P. 972], be-
came possible. There the question was whether the foregoing 
provision of the Direct Primary Law prevented the election 
of another by the "write-in" method. In that ease Childs, 
who sought nomination for the office of superior judge in Del 
Norte County, was defeated for the nomination at the primary 
election of 1914. Miller, his opponent, received a majority of 
all the votes east for nominees for the office at the primary, 
and his name was the only name printed on the ballot at the 
November election. But after his defeat for the nomination 
Childs conducted a "write-in" campaign for election to the 
office in November and he received the majority of the votes 
east. Miller contested, but it was held that Childs was duly 
elected because the provision that the name of the candidate 
who received the majority vote at the primary should be the 
only one for such office "placed on the official ballot" at the 
ensuing November election, did not prevent another candi-
date's name being written in by the voters. 
Probably to prevent similar results in other cases the people 
in November, 1926, adopted section 2% of article n of the 
Constitution providing for the inclusion of the judicial office 
in the nonpartisan offices for which candidates might be 
elected. at the primary election. The pertinent portion of 
that section reads: "Any candidate for a judicial, school, 
county, township, or other nonpartisan office who at a primary 
election shall receive votes on a majority of all the ballots 
cast for candidates for the office for which such candidate 
seek nomination, shall be elected to such office." In the 
argument to the voters it was said that the constitutional 
) 
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amendment was designed to cure an injustice existing in the 
law which did not include the judiciary among the non-
partisan candidates who could be elected at the primary elec-
tion, and to put the judiciary on a parity with other non-
partisan official!!. There was no argument against the meas-
ure. 
The method of filling vacancies in the office of judge of 
the superior court was changed in 1926. Prior to that time 
when a vacancy occurred section 6 of article VI of the Con-
stitution (as revised in 1879) vested in the governor the power 
to appoint a person to hold the office until the election and 
qualification of a judge to ft1] the vacancy, the election to 
take place at the next succeeding general election, and the 
person so elected to hold office for the remainder of the un-
expired term, At the general election of November, 1926, 
the present section 8 of article VI above quoted was adopted 
to replace the then existing provisions of section 6 of that 
article. At that election the following statement was made 
to the voters, with no counterargument: "The election of 
judges of the superior court for a 'short term,' which is 
sometimes for only a few weeks between election day and 
the following January, is done away with, and whenever a 
vacancy occurs prior to April first of an election year a 
judge will be elected at the general election to hold office 
for the full term of six years. If a vacancy oceur after April 
first of an election year the time is too short to circulate peti-
tions and satisfactorily prepare for an election at the August 
primary, and in such case the governor will make an appoint-
ment to till the vacancy until the next election year." 
The amendment eliminated the principal objectionable fea-
ture from the prior provision which was the election of a 
successor to hold office for the remainder of tke une:r;pired 
term. This was the so-called "short term" referred to in the 
argument. Since then the election has been for a full six-year 
term instead of an unexpired term. In order, however, to give 
the candidate sufficient time to prepare and file his nomination 
papers and the people sufficient time to consider a successor 
for a full rather than a partial or "short" term, it is also pro-
vided that the successor should not be elected at the next 
succeeding election if the vacancy occurred in an election year 
after April first. 
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occurred on April 19th in an election year. Nevertheless it 
was there held that the election of a successor for a full six-
year term should take place in the same year, which was the 
last year of the incumbent's term, because there was yet 
time in that year for the election processes to funetion. The 
result in that ease is not controlling on the faets presently 
before the court and in so far as it is inconsistent with the 
conclusion herein that ease is overruled. 
., 
Here a candidate to succeed the incumbent (being the in· 
eumbent himself) upon expiration of his term of office in 
January, 1947, was elected at the 1946 primary, and died 
shortly thereafter. The respondents contend that neverthe-
Jess an opportunity should be dorded to file independent 
nominations, and that the voters should not be deprived of 
their privilege to "write-in" a candidate's name at the forth· 
coming November eleetion. The difficulty with their position . 
is that as to the selection of a successor to take office upon ! 
the upirationof the ineumbent's term, the elective proeesses 
have already spent their foree. By the self.exeeuting provi. 
sion of section 2% of article n of the Constitution (see D .. 
WDody v. Belding. 210 Oal. 461 f292 P. 265] ; Kerr v. RusBell, 
209 Cal. 36 f285 P. 3111), a successor was elected, and there 
is no election for that office to go before the people in Novem· I 
ber. It is argued that the death of the ineumbent following 
his reelection left a vacancy in each of two terms, that is, 
a present vacaney in the occupied term expiring in January, 
1947, and a vacancy in futuro in the term to which he was 
eJected for the six years commeneing in January, 1947. Ac-
tually any "term" for which Judge Beardsley had been 
elected ceased to exist when he died. The vacancy in the 
office is a eontinuing one whieh lasts until a new six-year term. 
shall commence in January, 1949, for a pe~n elected at the 
1948 election. The situation calls for an appointment to fill 
the office until the new term commences. 
It follows that the respondents should be directed to omit 
from the ballot to be used at the fortheoming general elec-
tion any mention of the office of Judge of the Superior Court, 
County of Los Angeles, Office No. 10. 
Let the peremptory writ issue accordingly, eifeetive imme-
diately. 
Edmonds. J ... Carter, J., and Schauer, J .. concurred. 
.. , 
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The result reached in the majority opinion is highly desir-
able 88 it avoids what ha.s been termed a "hit-and-miss, 
slipshod, irregular election" (see 81a#e v. Claussen, 216 Iowa 
1079 r250 N.W. 195]) for the important office of judge of 
the superior court. I deem it unfortunate, however, that the 
majority of this court ha.s thought it necessary or proper 
to overrule in any measure the ease of Bearden v. Collim, 
220 Cal. '759 [32 P.2d 604]. While that ease W88 decided 
by a divided court, the majority opinion there placed a work-
able, common-aense construction upon section 8 of article VI, 
baaed upon a reading of the entire section in the light of its 
history and purposes, and in the light of other sections of 
. the Constitution, rather than a· construction based upon a 
literal reading of a single sentence, . which construction will 
admittedly lead to confusion and to absurd results in many 
eases • 
.As was said in BeGrden v. Oolli""" IUpra, at pages 761 and 
762: "Clearly, the provision does not contemplate a deferred 
election in a year when the general law providl!S for a regular 
election to il1l the new term to begin the following year. 
Therefore, when a term is expiring at the close of the year 
of a general election, the occurring of a vacancy at any time 
in such year is a false quantity, except that, under the last 
sentence of said provision, the vacancy can be il1led by the 
Governor, until the commencement of the new term. More-
over, in order to harmonize the first sentence of said provi-
sion and other related provisions of the Constitution with the 
sentence under construction, it is necessary to give it the above 
meaning." In other words, whenever by reason of the apo 
p~ching expiration of the term of an incumbent in the 
following January, an election to il1l the new term is sched-
uled to take place at the general election in any given year. 
that election must proceed to completion in that year re-
gardless of any vacancy which may occur at any time in that 
year, whether before or after April 1, by reason of the death 
or resignation of the incumbent. The majority of the court 
there refused to reBt. upon a literal construction of a single 
sentence of section 8 of article VI of the Constitution, which 
construction would permit an incumhnt to resign at any time 
after April 1 and either (1) thereby defer the pending elec-
tion for two years, or perhaps longer, if the next appointee 
.. , 
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ahould similarly resign t.wo ye&rIi later and after April 1, or 
(2) thereby nullify the results of a completed election of 
the successful opponent of the incumbent or nullify the re-
sults of a completed election of a sueeessful candidate in an 
election in which the incumbent might not have been 8 candi- . 
date. The dissenting opinion in that ease apparently recog-
nized such dimeulties when it there said at page 764: "If 
under a di1ferent state of the facts its literal enforcement 
would lead to an absurdity or tend to thwart the preferential 
right to elect, that situation may adequately be dealt with 
when it arrives." In other words. such literal construction 
admittedly cannot stand the test under aD ei.renm.stanees. 
As I lead the majority opinion in the present ease, it not 
only expressly overrnles Bea.rden v. CoZZifLS, lUpra., "in 80 far 
IS it is inconsistent with the conclusion" reached, but it also 
contains language which seems to indicate the adoption in fofo 
of the views expressed in the dissenting opinion in that ease. 
This leaves the law in a state of confusion as election oftlcials 
and candidates for office of superior court judge will be 
compelled to speculate, whenever an incumbent dies or re-
signs after April 1 in the election year at the end of his term, 
as to whether a majority of this court will adhere to a literal 
construction of the single sentence of said section 8 of arti-
cle VI or will abandon such construction because in the par-
tico.lar eireumstaDees they may feel that such construction 
"would lead to an absurdity or tend to thwart the 'Preferen-
tial right to elect." 
In my opinion, the views expressed in the majority opinion 
in Bea.rden v. ColUm. lUpra., are sound and there should be 
no departure from those views. The underlying purpose 
of the adoption of section 8 of article VI of the Constitution 
was to avoid confusion in the operation . of the election 
processes but the majority opinion here tends to create con-
fusion as above indicated. In. the bal10t argument., quoted 
in the majority opinion, it is said: "If a vacancy occur after 
April 1 of an election year, the time is too short to circulate 
petitions. " This is not true in the election year at the end 
of an incumbent's term when an election is to be held in 
the normal course and aD persons know before the beginning 
of that year that an election is to be held and that petitions 
lDay be circulated. The section under consideration was de-
signed to defer an election to ftll a vacancy occurring after 
April 1 only in those general election yean in the middle of 
) 
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a term of the incumbent when no election would normally 
be beld in that year for the incumbent's office. In such years, 
any attempt to get the election processes into operation to 
fill an unexpected vacancy occurring after April 1 would 
almost necessarily lead to eonfusion and to a "hit-and-miss" 
election. The section was not designed, however, to disrupt 
the normal election processes in the general election year at 
the end of the term of the incumbent and thereby to deprive 
the electorate of the right to participate in an election at 
least once in each six years for the office of judge of the 
superior court. To adhere to a literal construction of the 
single sentence under consideration might deprive the elec-
torate of that right for an indefinite period, for every normal 
election for the office to be held in the last year of the in-
cumbent's term might be deferred at the will of the incum-
bent or by the hand of fate. 
The views expressed above do not, however, lead me to 
the eonclusion that the writ should be denied under the cir-
cumstances presented bere. In the present case, unlike the 
Bearden case, the election bad been completed at the primary 
with the election of Judge Beardsley for another term. The 
only question here is whether the death of Judge Beardsley, 
following his election at the primary, should be held to open 
the door to a "hit-and.miss" election at the general election 
in November of this year. In my opinion, the answer to tbia 
question should be in the negative despite the fact that I 
believe such conclusion necessitates the overruling, at least in 
part, of DeWoody v. Belding, 210 Oal. 461 [292 P. 265], 
which case was likewise decided by a divided court. I agree 
with the majority opinion in that case in so far as it holds 
that the candidate who was successful in obtaining a major-
ity of all votes cast at the primary was "elected at the pri. 
maries," that such election "was in effect a final election," 
and that the death of the successful candidate after the 
primary "did not convert the primary election into a nomi· 
nating election." I do not agree, however, that the subse-
quent death of the successful candidate rendered such elec-
tion "abortive." While his subsequent death prevented him 
from later qualifying for the office for the new term, it did 
not affect the validity of his prior "final" election. There 
the election processes had spent their full force for that office 
for that year and a second "final" election should not have 
been held for that office at the general election of that Tear 
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but should have awaited the orderly procedure provided for 
the primary and general election two years later. The same 
situation is presented here and no second "final" election 
should be held for the office in question at the general elec-
tion this year. 1 therefore believe that DeWoody v. Belding, 
IUpra, should be overruled in 80 far as it is inconsistent with 
the views above expressed. 
In the present case, it should be said in justice to respond-
ents that their opposition to the issuance of the writ was 
apparently fully justified by their reliance upon the major-
ity opinions in Bearden v. OoUins. supra, and DeWoody v. 
Belding, supra. But t.he result of sustaining the position of 
respondents would be to compel the holding of a "hit-and-
miss" election in November, at which election any person 
obtaining a mere plurality of vote.~ by the "write-in" method 
or otherwise would be elected. In my opinion, there is noth-
ing in our election laws which requires or permits the holding 
of a second "final" election of this type. 
In ordering the writ to issue. it appears absolutely neces-'l 
sary for this court to disapprove, at least in part, one or the ~ 
other of the majority opinions in the above mentioned cases"j 
The majority of this court has deemed it proper to disapprove, 
at least in part, the majority opinion in Bearden v. OoUin" ,,1 
IUpra. It appears to me preferable to disapprove, at least 
in part, the majority opinion in DeWoody v. Belding, IUpra. 
While it is regrettable that the members of this court find 
themselves divided in their views on this important phase 
of the law governing elections, I feel impelled to express my 
views in opposition to the disapproval by the majority opin-
ion here of the construction placed upon said section 8 of 
article VI by the majority opinion in Bearden v. Collins, 
supra. That construction is one which will in all circumstances 
avoid the interruption of the normal election processes by 
the possible occurrence of unexpected vacancies while such 
normal election process~ are operating, and is a construction 
which will clearly indicate the course to be pursued by the 
officials charged with the duty of supervising the operation 
of such election processes. 
TRAYNOR, J.-l dissent on the authority of Bearden Y. 
CoUins, 220 Cal. 759, 761 (32 P.2d 604], and DeWoody Y. 
Belding, 210 Cal. 461, 464, 465 (292 P. 265]. In my opinion 
neither of these eases should be overruled. 
